It will hurt people differ to the extent to watch me slam my thumb witha hammer.
请问这里differ是动词吗?请老师剖析一下这个句子。
在网上查了下，你的句子确实有误。原句源于耶鲁大学的一篇心理学演讲。原文是如此的：
People differ to the extentit will hurt them to watch me slam my thumb with a hammer. 不一样的人看到我用锤子敲打拇指会感觉到不同程度的痛苦。
原文如下：
Introductionto Psychology
YaleUniversity Lecture 15
Let me begin by just reminding us where we are in this course,reminding us of what we've done and what we have yet to do. We started bytalking about the brain, the physical basis of thought. And then we moved tosome general introductions to some foundational ideas in the study ofpsychology, Freud and Skinner. We spent a bit of time on more cognitive stuff:development, language, vision, memory. Then we took a little break and the deantold us about love. Then we dealt with the emotions, rationality, andevolution, and a lot of that. What we learned particularly regarding theevolution of the mind provided supporting material for what follows. We learnedabout cognitive neuroscience using the study of face recognition as animportant case study--human differences, behavioral genetics, nature andnurture, sex and food. My lecture was on sex. Dr. Brownell came and spoke to usabout food. Today, morality. Next week, social thought and social behavior,mysteries; basically, a series of TOPics that don't fit anywhere in the courseand really make psychologists scratch their heads. These TOPics are sleep,laughter, and religion, mental illness, two lectures on madness, what can gowrong in your minds, and a last lecture on happiness. And then you're justdone. You know a lot of psychology and a lot of stuff and you're well preparedfor your ultimate major in psychology, ultimately graduate training at a goodschool. How many people here are either psych majors or expect to become psychmajors or cognitive science as though you could raise your hand to? Okay. Good.It's nowhere near enough [laughter] and so I'll ask the question again. onceyou deal with happiness and then mysteries, you're really not going to wantto--What is there? Chemistry? Anthropology? [laughter] Pre-med? Give me abreak. [laughter] Okay. We're going to deal with three facets of morality. I'mgoing to talk about moral feelings, moral judgments, and then moral action withparticular focus on why good people do bad things, which will lead us to reviewand discuss the Milgram study, which was presented in the movie on Monday. Now,moral feeling is what we'll start off with and we've already discussed this ina different context. The question is, 'How could moral feelings evolve? So,moral feelings we could view as feelings of condemnation, shame, emotions likethat--shame, condemnation, pride, righteous anger, but also simple affection,caring for other people, wanting to do well by them, being upset if aninjustice is to be done by them. And you might think that the existence ofthese feelings is a mystery from an evolutionary point of view. If evolution issurvival of the fittest, nature red in tooth and claw, how could animals evolvemoral feelings? But in fact, we know the answer to this. And there are twoanswers to this. One answer is kin selection. So, evolution works at a level ofthe genes and because of that it could give rise to animals that are themselvesaltruistic. And they're altruistic because they act to preserve other animalsthat share the same genes. And so, I'm not going to spend any time on thisbecause we've discussed it in detail, but we know from previous lectures thatpeople will be generous to others. And there's an evolutionary explanation foryour generosity towards kin. It could be mathematically worked out. Yourcaring, your moral feelings towards other creatures to the extent of theproportion of genes that you share with them. The most altruistic behavior ofall, giving your life to help another, can be explained in cold-bloodedevolutionary terms. Animals that are altruistic even to the point of dying tohelp another, those genes will, under some circumstances, be preserved over thegenes of people who are less caring. And that is one force towards kindness. Asecond force towards kindness is cooperation. Even if animals are unrelated,they are nice to one another. Animals will give warning cries, they will groomone another, they will exchange food, and the reason for this 2 Introduction toPsychology Yale University Lecture 15 is that animals have evolved, our mindshave evolved, to enter into sort of cooperative situations with other peopleand to surmount prisoner's dilemmas, to surmount deception and cheating. Thisgives rise to some emotion including emotions that could be viewed as moralemotions, like guilt and anger, and again, grounds altruistic behavior in anevolutionary perspective. This is all by means of review but the question youcan now ask is, Fine. That's why moral feelings might evolve, but what do weknow as psychologists about the emergence in nature of moral feelings inindividuals? What's the psychology of moral feeling? And this is an issue I'mgoing to talk about now but I'm going to return to next week when we deal withissues such as liking and disliking, racial prejudice and other things. But Iwant to deal now with a couple of interesting case studies about moral feelingsfrom a psychological point of view. The first one I want to deal with i百度竞价推广pathy. And empathy has different definitions but we can simply view it as thefeeling that your pain matters to me. If you are hurt, that is, in some sense,painful for me. If you are sad, that affects my own mood. I am not a selfishcreature. I am built, I am hard wired, to be attuned to your pain. This is anold observation. Adam Smith, who is often falsely viewed as a proponent ofselfishness and hardheadedness, was quite explicit about the pull this has. Henotes: When we see a stroke aimed and just ready to fall upon the leg or arm ofanother person, we naturally shrink and draw back our own leg or arm and whenit does fall we feel it in some measure and are hurt by it as well as thesufferer. If you see somebody being kicked in the groin in a movie, you mightyourself tense up. If you see somebody bang their thumb with a hammer, youmight cringe. Here is a good illustration of somebody in anticipatory pain.[laughter] Now--It's a very British face actually. [laughter] Now, we knowcertain things about this empathy, some which might be surprising. The pain ofothers is aversive even for babies. We know this because if babies hear otherbabies crying they will get upset. The crying of babies is aversive to babies.Now, some of you may be sufficiently cynical to say, That could be explained inother ways. For one thing, one theory is that babies hear other babies cry,because babies are so stupid they think they themselves are crying; if they'recrying they must be in some sort of pain so they cry some more. But cleverpsychologists have ruled this out. What they did was a study where they exposedbabies to tape-recorded sounds of other babies crying and tape recorded soundsof themselves crying. Babies cry more to this pain of other babies than they doto their own pain, suggesting that their response is to some extent a responseto the otherness of the characters. We know pain is--of others is aversive forchimpanzees and we know this in certain ways. But we know this, in particular,from a series of studies that would be unethical if they were to be done today.In these studies, they put a chimpanzee in a room and there's a lever. And whenthe chimpanzee slaps the lever, it gets some food. Trivial, smart animal, pieceof cake. But the room has a window leading to another room. And in the otherroom another chimpanzee is placed. This second chimpanzee is not a relative ofthe first chimpanzee and they've never seen each other before. Now, when thefirst chimpanzee hits the lever the second chimpanzee gets a painful electricshock, putting the first chimpanzee in a horrible dilemma. In 3 Introduction toPsychology Yale University Lecture 15 order to feed himself, he has to tortureanother animal. Chimpanzees do not starve themselves to death. It's veryunlikely any of you would either but they go a long time without food,suggesting they do not want to cause this other chimpanzee pain. It only workswithin species. So, in another experiment they put a rabbit in the other roomand the chimpanzee would slap the lever repeatedly to make the rabbit scream inpain [laughter] and jump. Now, we've known for a long time that empathetic feelingis not logically linked to morality. This is a point made by Aristotle. I couldsee you writhing in pain. That could cause me pain but it doesn't mean I'mgoing to be nice to you. I could run away from you. I could turn my head or Icould blame you for causing me this misery. But it does happen thatemotional--that this sort of empathy does lead to moral concern and action. Ifwe do an experiment and we induce you to feel empathetic to somebody, we getyou to feel what they're feeling, you're more likely to be nice to them. Andpeople differ in the extent to which they feel empathy. People differ to the extent it will hurt themto watch me slam my thumb with a hammer. If you are high empathy,you're more likely to be a nice person than if you're low empathy, suggestingthere is some connection between empathetic feeling and liking. Now, empatheticfeeling, like any other human capacity, differs across people. Some of us havea lot of it. Some of us don't have much of it. There is some reason to believethat in the population known as psychopaths, a population we'll return to lateron when we discuss mental illness, this sort of instinctive empathy is brokenand the pain of others just doesn't bother them very much. I have someillustrative quotes here. In Damon's book, a wonderful book on psychopathy, hetalks about a thirteen-year-old mugger who specialized in mugging blind people.And when asked about the pain he caused his victims he responded, What do Icare? I'm not her, which is logically correct but, in a sense, inhuman. Thefact that it's another person should make you care. The serial killer GaryGilmore basically said the pain of others gratified him and caused him nounhappiness at all. I was always capable of murder. I can become totally devoidof feelings of others, unemotional.